In this article, we create, validate, and analyze new dynamic measures of state partisanship, state policy mood, and state political ideology. The measures of partisanship and policy mood begin in 1956 and the measure of ideology begins in 1976. Our approach uses the advantages of two leading techniques for measuring state public opinion-multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) and survey aggregation. The resulting estimates are based on nearly 500 different surveys with a total of more than 740,000 respondents. After validating our measures, we show that during the last half century, policy preferences in the states have shifted in important and sometimes surprising ways. For example, we find that differences in political attitudes across time can be as important as differences across states. Another important advance in the study of state opinion has come from reweighting national surveys to reflect state demographic characteristics (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2010; Lax and Phillips 2009b; Pacheco 2011; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004; Pool, Abelson, and Popkin 1965; Weber et al. 1972) . Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2004) and Lax and Phillips (2009b) have shown that national surveys can produce valid and reliable estimates of state opinion with a two-step process called multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP). 1 In the first step, a multilevel regression model is fit to estimate the relationship between individual demographic and geographic variables and the survey response. In the second step, the regression estimates are used to predict responses for each demographic-geographic respondent type, which are then poststratified (i.e., weighted) based on census data.
strategy for generating over time state-level estimates of the public's policy preferences in more specific policy areas. The article proceeds as follows. The subsequent section details the data we use and our application of MRP. We then validate our opinion measures, relying on existing estimates of state partisanship and ideology (Carsey and Harden 2010; Pacheco 2011) as well as data from 428 different state opinion polls. After documenting important patterns of opinion change in the states, we conclude by discussing the implications of our measurement strategy and avenues for future research.
Measuring State Opinion
Our aim is to generate valid dynamic measures of partisanship, political ideology, and policy mood for each state. The partisanship and policy mood series extend from the 1950s to 2010. Due to data limitations, the political ideology series begins in 1976. We focus on these three measures of political attitudes for several reasons. The role of partisanship in U.S. politics has been increasing since the 1970s. Thus, dynamic statelevel measures of partisanship are important for a variety of research areas, such as the partisan composition of the states (Glaeser and Ward 2006) , shifting patterns of partisan voting in the states (Hopkins and Stoker 2011) , and whether the polarization of state politicians (Shor and McCarty 2011) has led or followed state publics. Policy mood, which measures the public's relative support for New Deal/social-welfare-type policies (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Stimson 1991) , offers a key measure of public opinion. At the national level, the public's policy mood influences election outcomes (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) , policy outputs (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) , party identification (Ellis 2010) , and Supreme Court decisions (Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011; McGuire and Stimson 2004) . 2 A dynamic statelevel measure of policy mood will allow scholars to assess whether the influence of the public's policy liberalism extends to state political outputs. 3 Finally, we focus on selfidentified political ideology (i.e., whether individuals identify as liberal or conservative) because ideology has become a central factor in the study of state (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; and national politics (Ellis and Stimson 2009; .
Our measurement strategy follows several steps. First, we used the University of Connecticut's Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, the American National Election Studies (ANES), and the General Social Survey (GSS) to identify every public opinion poll that includes at least one survey question used by Stimson (1999) to measure policy mood and for which individual data (including state of residence) are available. Because we are interested in measuring over time opinion, we only retained questions that were asked at three or more time points. 4 This left us with 73 distinct questions that were asked a total of 1,082 times in 322 different surveys. 5 The resulting database includes responses from more than half-a-million respondents. 6 This is an impressive amount of information. However, even more surveys have asked about party identification. For years, when we had fewer than 10,000 respondents, we identified additional surveys that asked the party identification question. Thus, we were able to add approximately 200,000 additional respondent observations for the party identification estimates. With these additions, we have an average of 13,478 respondents per year and a minimum of 9,649 respondents per year. Since 1976, almost all surveys that ask about party identification also ask about political ideology. Our ideology series begins in 1976 and includes almost the same number of respondents (per year) as the party identification series. 7 With these sample sizes, we could simply pool the data by year and calculate the responses by state. However, our second step uses MRP to improve our estimates of state-level opinion. Our approach is similar to that of Lax and Phillips (2009b) . First, we estimate a multilevel model of individual survey response. Opinion is modeled as a function of gender (female or male), race (black, white, or other), age (18-29, 30-44, 45-64, or 65+) , education (less than high school, high school, some college, college graduate, or more), state, and region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West, or D.C.) . 8 The individual responses are modeled as nested within states nested within region. The state of the respondent is used to estimate state-level effects, which themselves are modeled as a function of region and state vote in the previous presidential election. 9 Thus, our model of individual survey response incorporates individual and regional characteristics. 10 Based on this model, we then predict, for each demographic-geographic respondent (e.g., female, African American, 18-29, college degree, California), the probability of a liberal response to each opinion question each year. The result is a predicted response for each demographic-geographic respondent type to each question each year it was asked. Finally, we poststratify (i.e., weight) each demographicgeographic respondent type by the percentage of each type in the state population. These weights allow us to estimate the percentage of respondents within each state who support the liberal position on each of our questions for each year the question was asked. 11 MRP has been shown to recover valid state-level opinion estimates, even from a single national survey (Lax and Phillips 2009b; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006) . Thus, the combination of our large annual sample sizes with MRP offers an ideal measurement strategy.
The application of MRP to party identification and political ideology is straightforward. For each year, we pool responses to these questions and then use the process described above to estimate the percentage of self-identified Democrats and liberals in each state. 12 Our estimate of policy mood requires two steps. First, as described above, we estimate the percentage of liberal responses to each of the questions related to policy mood. This produces 73 different opinion series for each state. 13 Then, for each state, we use Stimson's (1991) Wcalc algorithm to combine these series into an over time measure of state policy mood. This algorithm uses a three-step process. First, because we are interested in over time variation in policy mood, it scales each question series to a common metric. Second, the algorithm uses a factor-analytic approach to generate a measure of policy mood based on the common over time variance of the individual series. Third, the means and standard deviations of the original series (weighted by their contribution to the resulting policy mood series) are used to place the resulting measure of policy mood on a meaningful metric. 14 In addition to its substantive importance for U.S. politics, policy mood is advantageous because this measure incorporates information from multiple survey questions at each time point, which reduces measurement error that would occur if we relied on a single survey item to measure the public's preferences (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008) .
Validation Strategy
Because comparable over time measures of state policy mood do not exist, our validation begins with our estimates of state partisanship. 15 We believe we are the first to generate dynamic measures of state partisanship since the 1950s, but for more recent years, we are able to compare our state partisanship estimates with existing measures of state partisanship. Because more surveys have asked about partisanship than about the policy questions that comprise our measure of policy mood, we restrict our validation of partisanship to only the same surveys we used to generate policy mood. Although our final measures of state partisanship are based on all our data, if we are able to validate our partisanship measures based on this more limited selection of surveys, we will have strong evidence to support the validity of the data and methods used to estimate policy mood.
First, we compare our measures of state partisanship with state opinion polls. We focus on six states-North Carolina, Illinois, New Jersey, Georgia, Michigan, and California. We select these states because they represent the most complete time series available for state opinion data-a total of 428 different surveys reflecting 432,950 total respondents and 150 years of observations. 16 In addition, these states vary in terms of their region, population, and partisanship. Thus, we are able to test that our estimates are valid across a variety of contexts. The overall correlation across all states and years (N = 150) is r = .78. This correlation is impressive because it indicates that our estimates track the over time changes in state-level partisanship. Figure 1 shows how our partisanship estimates compare with the state polls. The dashed line indicates the percent Democrat based on the state opinion polls and the gray region around this dashed line represents the margin of sampling error for the survey. The solid black line reflects our MRP estimates. We do not report confidence intervals around our estimates because evaluating whether our point estimate falls outside the margin of error of the state poll offers a more conservative test than a comparison of confidence intervals. Changes in how the California Field Poll coded responses to the partisanship question complicate the comparison with our estimates, so we begin by focusing on the other five states (Figures 1a-1e) . First, notice that consistent with the high correlation reported above, our estimates correspond closely with the levels in each state and with the over time trajectories. On average, our estimates are just 1.3 percentage points outside the margin of error. Furthermore, when our estimates are outside the margin of error, they are typically very close-75% of our estimates are within 2.5 percentage points of the margin of error, 85% are within 3.1 percentage points, and 95% of the observations are within 4.1 percentage points of the margin of error. While our estimates do not perfectly recover the partisanship based on state polls, the close correspondence between our measures and the state polls offers evidence of the validity of our strategy. 17 As noted above, we discuss California separately because a change in the response coding of the California Field Poll affects the results of this state opinion series. Figure 1f reports two California polls, the Field Poll and the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) Survey (1998 Survey ( -2009 . 18 Overall, we see a general correspondence between the California state polls and our estimates (r = .73). In To further validate our estimates, we turn to the measures of partisanship and ideology generated by Carsey and Harden (2010) and Pacheco (2011) . These measures have stood up to a variety of validity tests, indicating that they are well suited to serve as benchmarks for our estimates. Furthermore, the two measures rely on different methodological approaches and data. Similar to our strategy outlined above, Pacheco used a version of MRP to generate state-level estimates from national surveys. Pacheco's 2004 and 2006 estimates. 20 The lowest correlations are between the CCES estimates and our estimates (r = .77 and .74) and the CCES estimates and Pacheco's estimates (r = .81 and .80). While these correlations are still impressive, the lower values may reflect factors unique to the CCES, such as the Internet-based sample. 21 We can also use these data to validate our measures of state political ideology. Table 2 reports the correlations between our measures of state political ideology and measures of ideology generated by Pacheco (2011) and Carsey and Harden (2010) . 22 We again see strong correlations, suggesting all three measures offer valid measures of state political ideology. 23 Whether we examine state-level surveys or existing measures of state partisanship and ideology, the evidence above suggests that we have successfully recovered 
Over Time Shifts in State Partisanship, Policy Mood, and Political Ideology
To gain a sense of how political attitudes have changed in the states, Figure 3 reports the partisanship (percent Democrat) and policy mood in the early-1960s and the early2000s and political ideology (percent liberal) in the late-1970s and the early-2000s. In each subfigure, the hollow dots correspond with the earlier time period and the solid dots correspond with the later time period. The solid horizontal lines reflect 95% uncertainty estimates. 27 States are ordered on the y-axis from most conservative (top) to most liberal (bottom) based on values from the first time point (1960s for partisanship and policy mood and 1970s for ideology). We begin by discussing our partisanship estimates, which appear in Figure 3a . The estimates have high face validity. In the early-1960s, Southern states, such as Arkansas, Georgia, and Louisiana, are the most Democratic. The partisanship estimates for the early-2000s also coincide with expectations, as Washington, D.C., Maryland, and West Virginia are the most Democratic, and Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho are the least Democratic. 28 Also of note, our estimates suggest that the percentage of Democratic identifiers has declined in almost all states. Some of this decline results because the overall proportion of party identifiers decreased during this period (as the proportion of individuals identifying as independent increased). However, this partisan change is also consistent with the over time trajectory of Macropartisanship in Figure 2 , which shows that the proportion of Democrats relative to the proportion of Republicans has also decreased. This pattern is also consistent with the conservative shift in policy mood that appears in Figure 3b .
Looking at Figure 3b , we see that in the early-1960s, Washington, D.C., Connecticut, and Michigan correspond with the most liberal policy mood, and Hawaii, South Carolina, and Wyoming reflect the most conservative policy mood. 29 In the 2000s, the most liberal policy mood appears in Washington, D.C., New Jersey, Delaware, New York, and Massachusetts. We find the least liberal policy mood in Wyoming, Idaho, and North Dakota. These estimates align with contemporary views of state political environments. Also of note is the degree to which almost all states have shifted toward a more conservative policy mood (the average shift is 14 percentage points). In fact, the policy mood for Massachusetts and New York in the early-2000s is estimated to be more conservative than the policy mood of almost all states in the early-1960s. Although not all of these differences are statistically significant, we do estimate that the policy mood in Massachusetts in the early-2000s was significantly more conservative than the policy mood of some Southern states in the 1960s, such as North Carolina and Arkansas. At first glance, this conservative shift in policy mood across all states, indicating widespread decreases in support for New Deal/social-welfare-type policies, may be surprising. However, as we report in Figure 4 , an examination of individual survey questions reinforces this conclusion. All regions of the country appear to have expressed significantly more support for redistributive policies in the 1960s. such as Hawaii, New York, and California, occupy the most liberal positions, and states typically viewed as conservative, such as South Dakota, North Dakota, and Alabama, occupy the most conservative positions. Consistent with our estimates for partisanship and policy mood, we see that most states have shifted in a conservative direction. However, the shifts are not as large. Part of this difference stems from a different period of comparison (i.e., a 20-year difference instead of 40-year difference). Nevertheless, our results for the late-1970s and early-2000s are broadly consistent with past research that has suggested that political ideology in the states was relatively stable during this period (Brace et al. 2004; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 2006) . Some significant shifts have occurred (for 12 states, the 95% uncertainty estimates do not overlap), but the average shift across states is just 3.1% and the ordinal positions of the states have remained roughly consistent (r = .82). Of course, Figure 3 only reports results at two periods of time. For each of the series, our annual measures allow an examination of short-term shifts that may be masked by focusing on two time periods. Figure 3b shows that the policy mood in all states shifted substantially in the conservative direction between the early-1960s and early-2000s. In fact, we estimate the policy mood of almost all states in the early-2000s to be more conservative than the most conservative state in the early-1960s. The magnitude of these shifts begs the question: Did policy mood really shift this much? While we believe that the many validation tests in the first part of the article offer compelling support for our data and measurement strategies, we decided to further scrutinize this finding by examining two scope of government questions from the ANES. We select these questions because they were asked in the early-1960s and early-2000s, matching the periods compared in Figure 3b . Furthermore, the focus of these questions on the government's role in social policy provision makes them ideal indicators of policy mood (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Stimson 1991) .
Shifts in Policy Mood
Our aim is to see whether these questions, when analyzed by region, lead to a different conclusion than our results based on policy mood in Figure 3b . The answer is a clear "no." Figure 4a shows that agreement with the statement "The Government in Washington Is Not Getting too Powerful" declined by more than 10 percentage points during this period and this decline is evident across all regions of the country (we do not examine specific states because our intent is to see whether patterns in the raw data match our mood estimates). 30 A similar pattern emerges in Figure 4b . Across all regions, we see substantial declines in the percentage agreeing that the Government in Washington is not getting too powerful. Considering the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in July of that year, it is not surprising that in late-1964, those in the South were more likely to respond that the Government in Washington was getting too powerful. What is striking, however, is that despite this fact, in 2000, for every region of the country, the percentage responding that the government was not getting too strong was significantly less than the corresponding percentage in Southern states in 1964. 31 Whether we analyze individual survey questions or our policy mood estimates, all regions of the country appear more liberal in their attitudes toward the federal government's role in society during the 1960s. While the general liberal mood of the early-1960s is well known, we believe the similar patterns across geographic region are an important finding. Many scholars have devoted attention to understanding political attitudes across the states. These results suggest that over time shifts in political attitudes within states may be just as important as the differences across states.
Comparison with Other Measures
We also consider how our measures of state policy mood and state ideology compare with Berry et al.'s (1998) Soss et al. 2001 ) and has been viewed as an indicator of state ideology (Berry et al. 1998 ) and state policy mood (Berry et al. 2007; Berry et al. 2010) . Thus, it is useful to consider how our measures of state policy mood and political ideology compare with this measure. As we discuss below, there are reasons to expect that our measures will sometimes differ from the Berry et al. (1998) measure.
One difference may stem from redistricting and increased vote access since the start of the BRFH series in 1960. In 1962, the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr led to "one-person, one-vote," which (along with subsequent Supreme Court decisions) ended the practice of malapportionment. This change benefited urban and suburban voters, who were previously often underrepresented. Because suburban and urban voters had different policy preferences, party identification, and partisan voting behaviors than those in rural areas (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2004) , even if a state's policy preferences remained unchanged, different district compositions would produce different electoral and policy outcomes (McCubbins and Schwartz 1988) . As the BRFH measures rely on the votes of members of Congress to estimate citizen ideology, citizen ideology might appear increasingly liberal, not because opinions changed but because the relative weight of urban, suburban, and rural preferences had changed. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 may have produced a similar effect. The two decades following the Voting Rights Act saw a dramatic increase in the proportion of African American legislators elected in Southern states (Grofman and Handley 1991) . Again, even if state ideology remained constant, the composition of those elected, and thus the votes on the policies the interest groups evaluated, could differ. In sum, because the BRFH measure is based on interest group ratings of legislative votes, it captures changes in citizen preferences and institutional changes that influence who is elected.
We might expect the changes brought on by Baker v. Carr and the Voting Rights Act to have a particularly large effect on Southern states. Indeed, for Southern states, the average over time correlation between the BRFH measure and our measures of policy mood and ideology is negative (r = −.33 and −.11, respectively). The average over time correlation between the two measures for the rest of the states is r = .13 and .21 for mood and ideology, respectively. To get a further sense of the relationship between our state estimates and the BRFH measures, Figure 5 plots our policy mood and political ideology estimates alongside the BRFH measures for North Carolina, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. We focus on these states because they highlight some of the similarities and differences between the three measures. To facilitate over time comparison, within each state, the series have been scaled to a common mean. 34 Figures 5a and 5b show that in New Hampshire and Wyoming, for most of the period of analysis, BRFH's measure has moved roughly in tandem with policy mood and political ideology. 35 The similarities in these figures are consistent with previous Note. To facilitate over time comparison, in each subfigure, the series have been scaled to a common mean. Thus, the relative position of the series on the y-axis is not comparable and the observed variance in the series should not be compared across states. BRFH = Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson.
research suggesting that the BRFH measure corresponds with ideology (Berry et al. 1998 ) as well as with policy mood (Berry et al. 2007; Berry et al. 2010) . Figures 5c  and 5d show, by contrast, that the relationship between the BRFH measure and our measures differs substantially in some states. As noted above, it is the Southern states where we would expect reapportionment and the Voting Rights Act to have the largest effect on who is elected. Consistent with this expectation, we see striking differences between our measures and the BRFH measure in North Carolina and Mississippi. According to the BRFH measure, these states were at their most conservative in the late-1960s and have steadily become more liberal in the subsequent decades. The BRFH measure correlates with mood and ideology at r = −.67 and −.23 in North Carolina and r = −.65 and −.17 in Mississippi. Although we do not know with certainty the source of these differences, the shifts in district size and expanded access to the vote may help explain why the BRFH measure differs substantially from policy mood and ideology in these states. 36 Several other patterns in Figure 5 also warrant discussion. First, our measure of ideology and our measure of policy mood appear to move in similar ways within states. While policy mood and self-identified political ideology are typically viewed as distinct concepts (Ellis and Stimson 2012) , these over time similarities are not surprising. Ellis and Stimson (2012, 119, 186-87) found that the two concepts "appear to be broad indicators of the same general changes in mass political sentiment" and that these commonalities have increased since the 1970s. 37 The second pattern of note is that ideology and mood move in important ways across time. In particular, the relative stability of political ideology between the late-1970s and early-2000s, which we observed in Figure 3c , conceals shifts in ideology within this period. Finally, looking across subfigures, we see similar over time trajectories across states. Although some differences do exist, the public's policy mood and ideological liberalism appear to rise and fall together across different states. These similarities are consistent with the findings of Page and Shapiro (1992, 313) who concluded that "regional and community groupings generally move together (or stay the same) in opinion." This result is also consistent with past research that shows that different demographic groups typically update their policy mood in parallel (Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Enns and Wlezien 2011; Kelly and Enns 2010 ). Even at the state level, it appears that "aggregate opinion change . . . can largely be understood in terms of homogenous movements across the whole population" (Page and Shapiro 1992, 317) .
Conclusions and Implications
American voters elect more than 7,000 state legislators, and each year, these representatives pass an even greater number of laws. Yet, those seeking to account for the role of public opinion in state political processes have been hard-pressed to find the required data. We build on recent advances in the measurement of state-level public opinion to create and validate new over time measures of state partisanship, policy mood, and political ideology. Specifically, our measures take advantage of data aggregation (e.g., Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) and MRP (e.g., Lax and Phillips 2009b; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004) . Furthermore, we are able to reduce measurement error by aggregating multiple survey items into a single measure of policy mood (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008; Stimson 1991) . The result is the first annual time series of state opinion that extends from the 1950s to 2010.
We hope that these measures can be applied to many questions that are of central interest to state politics scholars as well as those interested in representation more broadly. For example, the measures of state opinion may contribute to important bodies of research on state elections (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002; Carsey and Wright 1998; Fowler 2005) , state policy outputs (Jacoby and Schneider 2001; Kelly and Witko 2012) , state interest group strength (Monogan, Gray, and Lowery 2009) , and even state court decisions (Brace and Boyea 2008; Brace and Hall 1997) . Furthermore, we believe the measures of state partisanship we have generated will greatly increase our understanding of the partisan composition of the states (Glaeser and Ward 2006) and the polarization of state political elites (Shor and McCarty 2011) .
We also hope that the methods we have brought together offer a template for generating dynamic state-level measures of policy preferences in more specific policy areas. In some cases, general measures like mood or partisanship may not be ideal for capturing specific attitudes (Brace et al. 2002; Norrander 2001) . At the national level, many important over time measures of policy-specific opinion have been generated by combining responses from related survey opinions. These include measures of racial policy liberalism (Kellstedt 2003) , the public's punitiveness (Enns 2010) , support for the death penalty (Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008) , and economic evaluations (McAvoy and Enns 2010). A key insight from our approach is that incorporating many question items from various surveys, as in these national-level series, reduces sampling error by increasing the number of observations and reduces measurement error by relying on multiple indicators of opinion. Thus, from a methodological standpoint, this approach is ideally suited for generating dynamic state-level estimates of policy-specific opinion. Furthermore, because state governments influence these policy domains in important ways, these also represent important substantive areas to study at the state level. In sum, given the availability of individual-level data from the University of Connecticut's Roper Center, the MRP methods advanced by Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2004) and Lax and Phillips (2009b) , and Stimson's (1991) Wcalc algorithm, which estimates latent opinion series from survey questions that have been asked at multiple time points, it is now possible to estimate valid over time opinion for a multitude of policy areas. We believe continued developments in the measurement of state public opinion, such as those provided here, will help scholars overcome previous data challenges, continuing the strong tradition of studying the states to not only better understand state-level political processes but also advance the study of U.S. politics and representation more broadly.
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Notes
1. Warshaw and Rodden (2012) have also shown that multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) can be used to produce valid estimates of district-level preferences. 2. Policy mood has also been shown to correspond with the votes of individual Supreme Court justices, and particularly with the justice that casts the pivotal "swing" vote (Enns and Wohlfarth 2013) . 3. Stimson (1991) reported two dimensions of policy mood. The first, as discussed above, corresponds with preferences for the size and scope of government. Although the second dimension is not as clearly defined as the first dimension, the second dimension has been described as "the social compassion side of liberalism" (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, 209-10) . Our focus in this article is on the first dimension, but we have estimated the second dimension and made these data publicly available (http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/ dv/Enns). 4. The survey questions come from the American National Election Studies (ANES), the General Social Survey (GSS) cumulative file, Gallup, Time, Roper, NBC, ABC, CBS, New York Times, Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. All question wording appears in Supplementary Appendix 1. 5. Although Stimson's (1991) policy mood is considered a measure of the public's preferences for more or less government, Stimson includes all available survey questions that relate to domestic policy or government spending. This approach minimizes researcher discretion in the selection of questions with little to no empirical cost (Stimson 1991, 40) . Because our goal is to replicate Stimson's (1991) policy mood, we follow his example and include all available policy questions that were asked at multiple time points and for which individual-level data are available. These 73 questions represent a substantial portion of the questions Stimson used to estimate mood. Although recent estimates of mood incorporate more survey question items, Stimson's (1999, 143-49) original mood estimates incorporated 77 separate items. Furthermore, mood has been successfully replicated with as few as 11 question items from the GSS (Ellis, Ura, and Robinson 2006) . 6. Specific details on the number of questions, surveys, and respondents from each year used to estimate policy mood are reported in Table A -1 in Supplementary Appendix 4. 7. Prior to 1976, the political ideology question was asked less frequently and when it was asked, necessary individual-level data, such as each respondent's state, are typically not available, so we do not estimate state ideology prior to this year. Specific details on the number of questions, surveys, and respondents from each year used to estimate partisanship and ideology are reported in Table A -2 in Supplementary Appendix 4. 8. When survey questions come from more than one poll, we also included an indicator to account for each poll in the model. The decision to treat Washington, D.C., as a separate region follows Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2006, 377) . 9. Presidential vote is based on two-party vote share. Because Washington, D.C., did not receive presidential electoral votes until 1961, for years prior to 1964, we assign Washington, D.C., its average vote share from the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections. 10. All models were estimated with GLMER in R. Our decision to nest states within region follows previous applications of MRP (Lax and Phillips 2009a; 2009b; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006) . As Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips (2009, 4) explained, including region as a group-level predictor "increases the amount of pooling done by the multilevel model, giving more precise estimates, especially for states with small populations." 11. The state population estimates that we use come from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) at the University of Minnesota (http://usa.ipums.org), which include 1% census samples for 1950, 1960, and 1970; 5% samples for 1980, 1990, and 2000; and 1% American Community Survey (ACS) samples for 2005-10. We relied on 1% samples when those were the only ones available. Between census years, we used linear interpolation to estimate state population characteristics. 12. We also estimated the percentage of Republicans and conservatives in each state. 13. These questions were asked a total of 1,082 times, for an average of 15 observations per question series. 14. Supplementary Appendix 5 offers a more detailed discussion of the Wcalc algorithm.
Additional details can also be found in Stimson (1991) and http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/ Software.html. Although our data include surveys from 1953, we report our mood estimates beginning in 1956, because the samples from the previous years are small. However, because Wcalc smoothes the estimates across years to reduce sampling error, our 1956 estimates include information from previous time periods. We used Wcalc5, which is the most recent version of the algorithm. The software is available from James Stimson's website: http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/Software.html. 15. The measure of state ideology generated by Berry et al. (1998) has been considered a proxy for Stimson's (1991) policy mood (Berry et al. 2007; Berry et al. 2010 ). In addition, Carsey and Harden (2010) Finkel and Scarrow (1985, 628) showed that in states such as California, which do not require voters to register with a party, the two question wordings (i.e., party identification and party registration) do not produce substantively different results. 19. Carsey and Harden (2010) Berry et al. (1998) used the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) Committee on Political Education (COPE) ratings of whether members of Congress voted in a liberal or conservative direction on key legislative items to identify the ideological position of each member of Congress. Berry et al. (1998) then estimated citizen ideology at the district level based on the ideology score for the district's incumbent (based on the interest group ratings), the estimated ideology score for the challenger the incumbent faced in the previous election, and the previous election results (which indicate district support for the two ideological positions). District ideology is then averaged to generate state citizen ideology scores. 34. Figure 5 is designed to allow over time comparison of the series within each state. Because each series has been scaled to a common mean (based on the years the three series overlap), the relative position of the series on the y-axis is not informative. In addition, the observed variance of series should not be compared across states. The updated Berry et al. (1998) data can be accessed from http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/. 35. In New Hampshire, the BRFH (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson) measure correlates with mood and ideology at r = .51 and .54, respectively. The corresponding correlations for Wyoming are .61 and .15. The strongest correlations between the BRFH measure and mood and the BRFH measure and ideology occur in Alaska (r = .82 and .61, respectively). 36. Another possible reason for differences between the BRFH measure and policy mood stems from the fact that the BRFH measure captures more than policy mood. According to Stimson (1991) , policy mood measures liberal and conservative preferences along New Deal/social-welfare-type policies. While many of the ADA and COPE ratings reflect these issues, not all do. For example, the ADA ratings include votes on civil rights, gun control, capital punishment, and same-sex marriage (http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/ voting-records.php). Because Berry et al. (1998, 334) computed the average of ADA and COPE scores, their measures will include information from all votes coded by these groups. By contrast, because Stimson's (1991) Wcalc algorithm uses a factor-analytic approach to identify common over time variance among question items, the resulting measure of policy mood will only incorporate information from questions that share common over time dynamics. Thus, citizen ideology, as measured by BRFH, reflects a broader scope of issues than policy mood. Of course, for some applications, the broader scope of the BRFH measures may be an advantage. 37. The measure of policy mood does not include the political ideology question, so the over time similarities do not reflect common question items.
